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ABSTRACT 
 
Megan M. Poole: When Allies Act: The Role of European Public Opinion in the 2011 
Military Intervention in Libya  
(Under the direction of Milada Anna Vachudova) 
 
 
This thesis investigates the conditions under which decisions for military intervention 
are constrained by public opinion.  Prior studies have identified electoral cycles and 
legislative checks as potential constraints on foreign policy making, but the interaction of 
these constraints and public opinion has gone largely unobserved.  This thesis utilizes the 
2011 NATO intervention in Libya as a case study to test whether the presence of upcoming 
elections or strong legislative checks on military deployment decisions are sufficient to 
motivate governments to make decisions about military intervention that are consistent with 
public opinion.  My findings suggest that governments are chiefly constrained to public 
opinion through immediate electoral pressures. Strong legislative checks on foreign policy 
failed to prove sufficient to constrain foreign policy to opinion.  These findings suggest that 
the inclusion of public opinion is critical for foreign policy analysis.  Also, with NATO 
contributions held hostage by electoral time horizons and public sentiment, it may be difficult 
for NATO to move beyond shifting coalitions of those willing to contribute to missions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% iv%
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES ……………………………………..………………………………….....vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ………………………………………..…..…………………………....vii 
 
CHAPTER 
 
INTRODUCTION……………………………..…………………………...…1 
 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW …………………………..………………………...5 
 
II. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS …………………..……………………..9 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN……………………………………..………………...12 
 
a. Case Selection: Libya ……………………………………..…………….13 
b. Case Selection: Case Countries …………………..…………..…………14 
c. Data and Operationalization………………………………………..…....18 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ………………………………………………..…22 
 
a. Key Case Studies ………………………………………………………..27 
i. Denmark …………………………………………………...........30 
ii. Poland ………………………………………….………...……...32 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ………………………………..……34 
 
VI. REFERENCES……………………………………………………...…….....37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
% v%
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1. Case Countries ……………………………………………………..…..………….16 
 
Table 2. Case Country Data for Empirical Analysis ………………………………..………20 
 
Table 3. Empirical Test: Electoral Constraint Hypothesis ……………………………..…...24 
 
Table 4. Legislative Constraints of Case Countries………………………………………....25 
 
Table 5. Empirical Test: Legislative Constraint Hypothesis ………………………...……...26 
 
  
% vi%
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. Paths to Observed Outcomes ………………………………………..……………28 
 
! 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In February 2011 protests in Libya escalated into violence between rebel and 
government forces.  By March, Muammar Gaddafi’s forces were preparing attacks on the 
rebels and the civilian population of Benghazi (STRATFOR 2011).  On March 17, 2011 the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, providing a mandate for a no-fly zone, arms 
embargo, asset freezes, and ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians in Libya (United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973: 3-5).  UN mandate in hand, a coalition of forces 
headed by the British and French implemented a no-fly zone and naval blockade on Libya, 
thwarting military attacks by Gaddafi.  On March 23, NATO launched Operation Unified 
Protector (OUP) to take over the mission in Libya (NATO 2011b).   
Despite being members of an alliance that was granted a UN mandate for a military 
mission to protect civilians, fourteen of NATO’s 28 members did not contribute to OUP.  
Many of the noncontributing NATO members simply lacked the resources required to 
enforce a no-fly zone and naval blockade, much less to conduct air strikes.  For!as!long!as!NATO!has!existed,!European!states!have!used!their!scarce!military!capabilities!to!justify!sitting!on!the!sidelines!during!military!operations.!!So!from!this!angle!there!is!little!to!be!learned!from intervention in Libya.  However, a number of European NATO members, 
notably Germany and Poland, were militarily capable yet refused to contribute to the 
mission.  In public statements on military intervention in Libya, many leaders evoked public 
! 2 
opinion as a significant factor in their decision-making (Bell & Hendrickson 2012: 156).  In 
this thesis I ask:  Does public opinion explain why some European states chose not to 
participate in OUP, while others contributed?  
I use Libya as a case study and test two factors which I hypothesize determine 
whether a NATO member’s decision about military intervention is constrained by public 
opinion: the proximity of the next election, and the strength of any legislative check on 
government decisions for military deployment.  My electoral constraint hypothesis 
recognizes that governments are always concerned about staying in power, but that these 
concerns are more acute in the immediate run up to an election (Gaubatz 1991).  I 
hypothesize that if there is an election on the horizon then public opinion determines whether 
or not a government chooses to participate in military intervention.  My legislative constraint 
hypothesis recognizes that public opinion exerts pressure on parliaments and if parliaments 
have significant influence over military deployments, they possess multiple veto points over 
policies that diverge from public opinion (Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall; Wagner, 
Peters, and Glahn 2010).  I hypothesize that if there is a strong legislative check on foreign 
policy then public opinion drives the decision over military intervention.  Conversely, I 
hypothesize that the absence of immediate electoral pressure or weak legislative checks on 
foreign policy, grants governments discretion to consider factors other than public opinion 
(e.g. alliance politics, humanitarian responsibilities, idiosyncratic factors).  
My findings suggest that governments are chiefly constrained to public opinion when 
elections are on the horizon.  Strong legislative checks on foreign policy are not sufficient to 
constrain governments to public opinion in their decision for military intervention.  As 
predicted, the impact of weak electoral and legislative constraints is indeterminate; in other 
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words, these constraints are not enough to predict government decisions for military 
intervention.  My findings however suggest that a lack of electoral pressure combined with 
weak legislative checks on foreign policy is sufficient to expect governments to contribute to 
NATO interventions regardless of public opinion.     
My thesis breaks new ground by showing that the timing of elections relative to a 
decision over military intervention is a significant intervening variable, moderating the role 
of public opinion in foreign policy making.  At the same time, I cast doubt over the role of 
parliaments as ‘transmission belts’ for public opinion on foreign policy.  My study integrates 
factors that scholars previously identified as important democratic constraints on military 
action, but whose interaction with actual public opinion has been largely neglected.  
This thesis also suggests lessons for NATO’s future missions.  In the wake of OUP, 
many commentators argued that Libya not only exposed capabilities deficits among 
European allies, but also a lack of political will (Clark 2011; Gates 2011; Hallams & Schreer 
2012; Howorth 2012).  My finding that governments are chiefly constrained to public 
opinion through immediate electoral pressure calls into question any broad conclusions about 
the future of NATO based on European political willingness to contribute in Libya.  Since 
the timing of elections is a dynamic and changing mechanism for public opinion to influence 
foreign policy, the lessons from European participation in OUP may be limited.  
Contributions to other NATO missions may vary according to changing electoral time 
horizons.  This means that the specific constellation of contributing and abstaining countries 
assembled for NATO’s 2011 mission may not be indicative of future missions, when 
different countries face different electoral constraints.  Nevertheless, the mission in Libya, a 
humanitarian intervention without ground troops, is the type of mission that NATO and its 
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European members will likely face again in the coming decades.  If an election is on the 
horizon, I show that public opinion is highly likely to determine whether or not a government 
chooses to participate in a NATO military operation.  My theory that electoral cycles can 
drive decisions about military intervention can be tested to help explain intervention 
decisions in the past – and to predict intervention in the future. 
The rest of this thesis is divided into five parts.  First, I explore the theoretical 
literature that has informed my hypotheses, and explain how my study breaks new ground.  
Second, I outline the theoretical expectations associated with my electoral and legislative 
constraint hypotheses.  Third, I discuss my research design, case selection, and evidence. 
Fourth, I present my empirical analysis, first testing my electoral and legislative constraint 
hypotheses and subsequently looking into the necessity and sufficiency of combinations of 
electoral and legislative constraining conditions.  I augment the results of this initial analysis 
by process tracing suspected sufficient conditions through the decision-making processes of 
two key countries: Denmark and Poland.  Finally, I conclude by qualifying my results and 
discussing the implications of my findings for NATO and academic discussions of public 
opinion-foreign policy linkages.    
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This section explores the literature on the role of public opinion and domestic 
institutional structures in foreign policy making.  I demonstrate how this thesis incorporates 
public opinion and domestic structures to analyze foreign policy in a new way.  In this 
section I include findings from Holsti (1992) and Risse-Kappen (1991) about the important 
but inconsistent role public opinion plays in foreign policy.  Second, I discuss Gaubatz’s 
(1991) focus on the role of electoral cycles in moderating decisions for military action. 
Finally, I consider various legislative structures that are thought to moderate decisions for 
military action (Auerswald 1999; 2000; Clark and Nordstrom 2005; Reiter and Tillman 2002; 
Wagner et al. 2010).  
The role of public opinion in foreign policy has not always been widely accepted in 
the scholarly community.  In the early 1990s, Holsti (1992) and Risse-Kappen (1991) 
reinvigorated scholarly discussion on the subject by establishing that public opinion does 
influence foreign policy and that this influence presents important avenues for research. 
Focusing on American public opinion, Holsti (1992) affirms the impact public opinion has on 
foreign policy, but recognizes that the opinion-policy link is the least well-developed area of 
existing literature.  My thesis contributes not only to this underdeveloped aspect of the 
discussion, but also to the neglected study of public opinion in foreign policy outside 
American politics.  The role of public opinion in American foreign policy is better studied 
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than that of other countries.  This neglect continues despite studies that demonstrate, for 
example, that European public opinion on foreign policy is as stable and coherent as opinion 
in the United States (Isernia, Juhasz, and Rattinger 2002).   
While public opinion does influence foreign policy, the link between opinion and 
policy is not unequivocal.  Risse-Kappen (1991) argues that public opinion influences 
foreign policy, but that this influence is indirect.  Risse-Kappen (1991) stresses the 
importance of domestic structures as intervening variables between public opinion and 
foreign policy. The decision of some European countries to join the coalition of the willing in 
Iraq despite oppositional public opinion demonstrates that decisions on military deployment 
do not always correlate with public opinion (Chan and Safran 2006; Dieterich et al. 2008; 
Mello 2012; Schuster and Maier 2006; Tago 2009).  Yet, instances of disregard for public 
opinion do not undermine the argument that public opinion plays a role in foreign policy 
making, but rather highlight the complexity of the link between opinion and foreign policy.  
Risse-Kappen’s (1991) investigation of institutional opportunity structures for public 
influence in foreign policy incorporates this complexity.  Risse-Kappen’s approach also 
provides the point of departure for my study of the interaction between public opinion and 
electoral and legislative constraints on decisions for military intervention.  
In the study of the influence public opinion has on decisions for military action, it is 
implied that elected politicians prioritize re-election.  Gaubatz (1991) hypothesizes that the 
power of society relative to the state varies within election cycles, with society strengthened 
close in time to an election. Gaubatz (1991) differentiates between democracies facing 
immediate elections and democracies facing no immediate elections, finding that 
democracies get into more wars early in the election cycle, and fewer wars as elections near.  
! 7 
My electoral constraint hypothesis builds on Gaubatz’s (1991) study in two aspects.  First, 
Gaubatz (1991) finds significant correlation between the election cycle and the decision for 
military conflict, but acknowledges shortcomings in terms of causal inference.  By focusing 
on the impact of the timing of elections in a single case study I better isolate the role of the 
election cycle in the policymaking process.  Secondly, Gaubatz (1991) assumes a war-averse 
public for the purposes of his study.  My electoral constraint hypothesis investigates the 
interaction between public opinion and the timing of elections, accounting for the neglected 
reality of actual public sentiment.   
My legislative constraint hypothesis builds on academic work that explores how 
domestic institutional structures influence decisions for military action.  First, I draw on 
Auerswald’s (1999; 2000) theoretical relationship between democratic subtype and military 
action.  Auerswald (1999) predicts that more majoritarian systems (Westminster and semi-
presidential) are less constrained than less majoritarian systems (coalition parliaments and 
presidential).  Auerswald (1999; 2000) argues that the established rules of interaction 
between the executive, legislature, and the public determine whom the executive is 
accountable to and the extent to which the legislature can challenge the executive.  Second, I 
incorporate Reiter and Tillman’s (2002) and Clark and Nordstrom’s (2005) arguments that 
single-party majority governments are less constrained in their foreign policy making than 
coalition governments.  Finally, I utilize Wagner et al.’s (2010) distinction between 
parliaments with and without an ex ante veto over military deployments, arguing that 
countries without an ex ante veto are less constrained than countries with parliaments that 
can veto military deployments. Wagner et al. (2010) stress that while the ex ante veto is not 
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the only aspect of parliamentary control over military policy, it is the strongest means a 
parliament has to constrain the decision for military action.   
The insights from this literature allow me to classify states with strong or weak 
legislative checks on foreign policy (see Table 4).  States with strong legislative checks on 
foreign policy include coalition parliamentary or presidential systems with a coalition 
government and/or a parliamentary ex ante veto over military deployments.  States with 
weaker legislative checks include Westminster parliamentary or semi-presidential systems 
with a single-majority government and/or the absence of a parliamentary ex ante veto over 
military deployments.  As with my electoral constraint hypothesis, I build on the existing 
literature by explicitly focusing on the interaction between public opinion and legislative 
constraints on foreign policy.  Unlike the existing literature, which assumes a conflict-averse 
public, this thesis investigates the directional pull of public sentiment.  This allows for a 
study of public sentiment that balances the costs of military intervention with other 
considerations, for example humanitarian responsibilities and alliance obligations.     
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II. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS 
 
 
In this section, I outline what decisions I expect European governments to make about 
military intervention given my electoral and legislative constraint hypotheses.  These 
theoretical expectations are based on the literature examined in the previous section and 
guide the remainder of this thesis.  Overall, I use a comparative approach to test the 
conditions under which foreign policy is constrained, or even determined by, public opinion.  
This approach integrates factors previously identified as important in understanding decisions 
made by governments about military intervention, but whose interaction with public opinion 
has been largely neglected.  
With my electoral constraint hypothesis (H1), I build on Gaubatz’s (1991) theory that 
governments are more constrained to public opinion in their foreign policies in the run-up to 
an election than if there are no immediate electoral pressures.  In other words, whether public 
opinion constrains government decision-making is moderated by the electoral cycle.  This 
leads to two predictions: 
 
H1a: If a government faces an immediate election, this condition is sufficient to 
motivate governments to make decisions about military intervention that are 
consistent with public opinion. 
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H1b: If a government does not face an immediate election, this condition is necessary 
but not sufficient for governments to diverge from public opinion in decisions about 
military intervention. 
 
Hence, I expect to see foreign policy that mirrors public opinion in countries where 
governments are facing elections within a year:  Governments engage in military intervention 
if public opinion is supportive, and stay on the sidelines if public opinion is opposed.  In the 
absence of upcoming elections, I expect governments to be less constrained to public 
opinion, facing the necessary condition for foreign policy to diverge from public opinion.  
Still, the absence of electoral constraints is not sufficient to predict whether foreign policy 
will actually diverge from public opinion.  I expect this to vary as governments have some 
flexibility to weigh public opinion against other political factors.   
My legislative constraint hypothesis investigates how legislative constraints moderate 
the influence of public opinion on government decisions over military intervention. My 
investigation of countries with strong or weak legislative constraints lead to two hypotheses 
(H2): 
 
H2a: If a government faces strong legislative checks on foreign policy making, this 
condition is sufficient to motivate governments to make decisions about military 
intervention that are consistent with public opinion. 
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H2b: If a government faces weak legislative checks on foreign policy making, this 
condition is necessary but not sufficient for governments to diverge from public 
opinion in decisions about military intervention. 
 
In sum, I predict that states with stronger legislatures are more constrained by public opinion 
in their foreign policies because the executive is less able to overcome domestic opposition.  
Therefore, I expect governments facing strong legislative constraints to intervene if public 
opinion is supportive of military intervention, and abstain if public opinion is opposed. 
Conversely, states with weaker legislatures are less constrained by public opinion because 
these states are better able to overcome domestic opposition in foreign policy making. This 
executive power relative to the legislature could be utilized to pursue foreign policy that 
indulges other policy objectives while diverging from public opinion.  But, the absence of a 
strong legislative constraint is not sufficient to predict whether foreign policy will actually 
diverge from public opinion.  
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
In this section I explain my decision to focus on the 2011 NATO intervention in 
Libya, how I select case countries, the evidence I employ, and how I operationalize my 
variables.  This thesis focuses on a small number of cases and investigates the conditions 
under which outcomes occur, rather than estimating the average effect of a set of independent 
variables.  When determining whether a decision for military intervention aligned with public 
opinion, causal relations are expressed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (Ragin 
1987; 2000).  Necessary conditions are conditions that must be present for an outcome to 
occur but do not guarantee such outcome.  Sufficient conditions are conditions that always 
lead to an outcome, but such outcome may also occur without the condition present.  I 
recognize the possibility of different paths to the same outcome and that individual 
conditions may not be singularly necessary or sufficient; I therefore examine the sufficiency 
of combinations of casual conditions as well (Ragin 2000: 91-95).  The conditions 
investigated in this analysis (timing of elections, legislative checks on foreign policy) are 
understood as intervening between an initial condition (public sentiment towards foreign 
policy) and a final outcome (foreign policy decision that mirrors or diverges from public 
opinion) (Mahoney 2012).   
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a. Case Selection: Libya 
  
Studying whether or not states chose to intervene in Libya in 2011 allows me to 
control for a number of variables. First, the selection of Libya conforms to the findings of 
public salience literature.  This literature suggests that instances of international crises raise 
foreign policy issue salience to a level that captures the attention of the public and thereby 
the attention of the government to public opinion (Oppermann and Viehrig 2009).   
Second, Libya is the first NATO mission to take place after the divisive 2003 
invasion of Iraq and years of unpopular NATO engagement in Afghanistan.  I argue that Iraq 
and Afghanistan, both involving massive ground troop deployments, were exceptional cases 
of post-Cold War military deployment.  On the other hand, the mission in Libya, as well as 
NATO actions in Serbia in the 1990s, were limited military interventions without the 
deployment of ground troops and intended to prevent the slaughter of civilians.  Libya and 
Serbia are more characteristic of the sort of mission NATO and European governments may 
see repeated in the coming decades (Valasek 2011).  The nature of the military intervention 
in Libya therefore makes this study generalizable beyond Libya, pointing to implications that 
can be considered across similar instances of NATO military interventions.     
Third, the intervention against Gaddafi’s regime had a humanitarian rationale and was 
endorsed by international and regional bodies (Valasek 2011).  To many, Libya represented 
the sort of mission European countries would most likely find appropriate for military 
intervention, given the humanitarian rationale, international mandate, and the strategic 
importance of North Africa (Howorth 2012).  However, German abstention from UN 
Resolution 1973 undermined the prospects for a EU mission.  Subsequently, European 
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contributions to OUP were mixed.  Given this, the study of the role of public opinion in 
European involvement in Libya provides insight into implications for NATO and the EU.  
 
b. Case Selection: Case Countries  
 
My cases meet three criteria: (1) they have democratic political institutions, (2) they 
are militarily capable of contributing to OUP, (3) and they are members of the EU and 
NATO.  As a threshold for uncontested democratic political institutions, I utilize the Polity 
IV Country Reports (2010) data, insuring that included countries scored an 8 or above on the 
combined autocracy-democracy scale (Marshall and Jaggers 2010).1  Military capability is 
determined by whether member states spent at least 2,000 million US dollars on military 
spending in 2011 (NATO 2011a).2  I limited my cases to members of both the EU and NATO 
because commentary in the wake of OUP highlights the lack of a EU response to the crisis in 
Libya, and the varied responses of EU member states to the subsequent military intervention.  
Given the centrality of the EU’s lack of a role in Libya, this case selection enables me to 
comment on the implications of Libya for the role of EU member states within NATO.3  
To enhance cross-case comparability and control for varying national interest in 
Libya, I applied three further criteria.  First, Libya’s former colonial power Italy is omitted to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Out of NATO’s members, this criterion excluded Turkey. 
 2!This threshold has been utilized to determine military capability to contribute to OUP by other 
authors, for example by Chapell (2011).  Out of NATO’s members, this criterion excluded Albania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Slovenia.       !3!Out of NATO’s members, this criterion excluded Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and 
the US.  
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avoid confounding any results with the complexities of post-colonial ties.4  Second, during 
the 2011 crisis Gaddafi explicitly used migration as a ‘weapon’ against European countries, 
framing the threat from Libya in terms of refugee flows (Coticchia 2011: 54).  Yet, as 
demonstrated by Italy, Malta, Cyprus, and Greece having to plead in Brussels for European 
solidarity in the face of an influx of North African refugees, such migration concerns were 
not deeply held by European countries beyond this part of the Mediterranean (Spiegel 2011).  
To control for extraordinary migration pressures emanating from Libya, Greece is also 
excluded from my set of cases.   
Finally, Belgium and Portugal are excluded from this analysis due to unusual 
domestic political circumstances.  In Belgium, the decision to intervene in Libya was taken 
nearly 300 days into a record-long period of government crisis under the rule of a temporary 
government.  This temporary government faced different political incentives and institutional 
constraints than Belgian governments usually face.  Hence, it is not possible to test the role of 
the Belgian legislature and public in constraining foreign policy to public opinion (Gertis 
2011; Presseurop 2011).  Portugal is omitted because on March 23, 2011, the same day 
NATO launched OUP, Portugal’s Prime Minister stepped down after the parliament rejected 
an austerity bill meant to prevent Portugal from seeking an international bailout (Alvarenga 
and Bugge 2011).  Given the timing of this political upheaval, Portugal is considered unable 
to contribute to OUP.   
Based on these criteria, I select nine European NATO countries for my analysis.  
Table 1 lists my cases, their Polity IV scores (2010) and military expenditures as of 2011. 
Nine cases are sufficient to look for cross-country trends rather than country-specific 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!On Italy and the 2011 intervention in Libya see Lombardi (2012).  
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phenomenon.  My empirical analysis of these cases is also complimented by more nuanced 
process tracing in key case countries.  These key case countries are identified in response to  
the initial empirical analysis of my cases.  Due to the limitations of this paper, I focus on 
countries that, in this initial analysis, demonstrated the most striking results.  This process 
tracing provide further evidence for my conclusions and strengthens my casual inference. 
My case selection allows me to control for alternative explanations for decisions  
 Polity 
IV 
(2010) 
Mil. 
Expenditures 
(2011, in 
mil. USD) 
% of total 
crude oil 
imported from 
Libya (2010) 
Arms Exports 
to Libya (in 
mil. euro) 
2005-2009 
Political Orientation of 
Government 
Czech Rep 8       2,448 -- 3.11 Right 
Denmark 10 4,518 -- -- Right 
France 9 53,444 15.7% 210.15 Right 
Germany 10 48,140 7.7% 83.48 Right 
Netherlands 10 11,339 2.3% -- Right 
Poland 10 8,908 -- 2.03 Right 
Romania 9 2,380 -- -- Grand Coalition 
Spain 10 13,984 12.1% 7.69 Left 
UK 10 63,567 8.5% 119.35 Right 
Table 1. Case Countries!
Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) scores represent the combined autocracy-democracy scale with 
scores of 10 representing the most democratic.  Military expenditures data was drawn from a 2011 
NATO report, Military Spending of the NATO countries from 1990 to 2011.  Percent of total crude oil 
imported from Libya as of 2010 comes from an International Energy Agency report on Libya (2011).  
Data on total European arms exports to Libya from 2005 to 2009 was drawn from a database 
published by the Guardian in 2011.  The author determined the political orientation of each 
government from the Parties and Elections in Europe database. “—“ indicates data missing from 
original source.  
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about intervention in Libya.  First, some international relations approaches reject the role of 
domestic politics in foreign policy making.  For example, theories derived from the realist 
tradition privilege systemic factors, such as relative power or alliance dependencies, over 
domestic political factors.  Even a cursory look at my case countries casts doubt on the 
applicability of these theories in Libya.  Not only was the intervention in Libya motivated by 
humanitarian aims rather than balance-of-power politics, but among my cases those that 
intervened and those that did not include large and small states, eastern and western states, 
and Atlanticist and Europeanist states.  
Second, it is possible to argue that domestic politics did affect European foreign 
policy making towards OUP, but that national interest accounts for the variation in European 
involvement and not pressure from domestic public opinion.  Such arguments point to 
economic ties, specifically oil and arms trade between European NATO allies and Libya, or 
to security concerns associated with migration.  I contend that such national interests provide 
an incomplete portrayal of the domestic political incentives and constraints facing European 
governments in their decision on OUP.  My selection of case countries demonstrates that 
even when controlling for concerns for migration, European policies present significant 
variation.  Moreover, my case countries had relatively comparable economic interests in 
Libya in terms of oil and arms trade (Table 1 includes indicators of these economic interests).  
Finally, it is possible to recognize that domestic public opinion influences foreign 
policy, but highlight alternative intervening variables to explain the varying constraint public 
sentiment places on foreign policy.  For example, some argue that partisan politics help 
explain European contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom (Mello 2012; Schuster and Maier 
2006).  These authors argue that right-of-center parties were more prone to military action 
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and more likely to send troops to Iraq in solidarity with the conservative American 
government that was leading the coalition (Mello 2012; Schuster and Maier 2006).  In the 
case of Libya, partisan effects are less clear-cut.  OUP was conducted with the lukewarm 
support of a left-of-center American government and the humanitarian rational of OUP, 
associated with the liberal internationalist tendencies of left-of-center governments, 
complicates the hypothesis that right-of-center governments are more prone to military 
action.  Overall, the partisan hypothesis appears inconclusive in Libya.    
 
c. Data and Operationalization 
 
This study derives the position of each country towards contributing to OUP from 
news coverage, policy statements, and NATO documentation of the mission in Libya.  
Whether each case country militarily intervened in Libya as part of OUP is then combined 
with public opinion data on the attitudes of citizens.  This helps determine whether the 
decision about intervention in Libya aligned with public opinion.  The 2011 Transatlantic 
Trends Survey (TTS) provides cross-country public opinion data for all case countries except 
Denmark and the Czech Republic (Kennedy et al. 2011).  This survey was conducted from 
May 25, 2011 to June 20, 2011 and asked respondents to what extent they approve or 
disapprove of military action in Libya by international forces.  The timing of the poll is 
problematic, as the poll was conducted just after the decision whether to intervene was made.  
Yet, TTS public opinion data is the best available measure for public opinion towards OUP 
since the availability of cross-country data is important for my analysis.  Czech public 
opinion is omitted from TTS and so I draw from a Czech poll by the Center for Analysis and 
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Empirical Studies (Johnston 2011).  The Czech poll posed a slightly different question, 
asking respondents whether the military campaign against Gaddafi was justified, rendering 
the Czech poll an imperfect but adequate supplement to TTS.  This poll was conducted 
between March 24 and 29, 2011 giving it a comparable timeline with the TTS poll.  
Similarly, I utilize Danish public opinion data from a Danish Gallup Poll conducted the same 
week (Buley 2011).  This poll asked Danes whether they support Danish military 
involvement in enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya.  These poll results are presented in Table 2.   
The European Election Database and Parties and Elections in Europe database 
provide data on the timing of elections in case countries (Nordsieck 2013; Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services 2013).  If a country was hosting a general, legislative, presidential, 
and/or regional election within 2011, that country is coded as facing an immediate election.  
If the next election was after 2011, the country is coded as facing no immediate election.  
Upcoming election dates are also presented in Table 2.    
In terms of my legislative constraint hypothesis, I utilize a number of sources to index 
three kinds of legislative constraints: democratic subtype, whether a single-party majority 
runs the government, and whether parliament has an ex ante veto over military deployments.  
The descriptive data for these legislative constraints is presented in Table 2.  I utilize the US 
Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (2013) field listing for government type, 
Polity IV (2010) details of governing coalitions, and Wagner et al.’s (2010) information on 
legislatures in each case country.  For each aspect of legislative checks on foreign policy, 
weak checks are coded as 0 and strong checks are coded as 1.  The sum of the three 
categories of legislative constraints represents the overall legislative constraint on foreign 
policy making in each country.  This places my case countries on a scale from 0 to 3 with 0 
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 Approve 
of OUP 
Disapprove 
of OUP 
Date of  
next election 
Democratic  
sub-type 
Nature of 
governing 
coalition 
Presence 
of ex 
ante veto 
Contribute 
to OUP 
Czech Rep 43.7%   34.4% Presid- Jan. 2013 Parliamentary Coalition Absent Did not 
intervene 
Denmark 78% -- Parli- Sep. 2011 Parliamentary Coalition Present Intervened 
France 58.4% 38.8% Senate- Sep. 
2011; Presid- 
Apr. 2012 
Semi-
presidential 
Single-
party 
majority 
Absent Intervened 
Germany 38.4% 58.3% State elections 
befor, after OUP 
Parliamentary Coalition Present  Did not 
intervene 
Netherlands 64.8% 31.4% Parli- Sep. 2012 Parliamentary Coalition Absent Intervened 
Poland 35.4% 47.4% Parli- Oct. 2011 Parliamentary Coalition Absent Did not 
intervene 
Romania 40.37% 50.69% Parli- Dec. 2012 Semi-
presidential 
Coalition Absent Intervened 
Spain 53.09% 41.12% Called early 
elections, Jul. 
2011  
Parliamentary Coalition Present Intervened 
 UK 55.04% 40.36% Parli- May 2015 Westminster Coalition Absent Intervened 
Table 2. Case Country Data for Empirical Analysis  !
Public opinion data from the 2011 Transatlantic Trends Survey for all countries except the Czech 
Republic and Denmark.  Czech public opinion from a Czech poll by the Center for Analysis and 
Empirical Studies and data on Denmark comes from a Danish Gallup Poll.  Date of next election derived 
from election statistics provided by the European Election Database.  Democratic subtype identified by 
author by looking at various databases and secondary-sources on the form of government in European 
countries.  Single-party majority and coalition governments were identified through the European Election 
Database and the Parties and Elections in Europe database.  The presence of absence of an ex ante veto of 
military deployments utilized Wagner et al.’s (2010) coding of parliamentary veto powers.  Wagner et 
al.’s (2010) data covered parliamentary powers up to 2004.  I have updated this dataset to account for a 
change of law since this time, notably in Spain in 2005.  The author, in consult with NATO sources, news 
coverage, and secondary-literature, determined the contribution of each country to OUP. “—“ indicates 
data missing from original source.  !
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representing those countries with the weakest legislative role in foreign policy making and 3 
representing those with the strongest legislative role.  
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
Under what conditions are foreign policy decisions constrained to public opinion?  I 
begin my analysis by focusing on the case study of Libya and whether the electoral cycle 
moderates the constraint public opinion has on foreign policy.  I first distinguish between 
governments facing immediate elections and those facing no immediate electoral pressure.  I 
determine that governments in four countries (Denmark, France, Germany, and Poland) faced 
immediate elections, while five governments did not (Czech Republic, Netherlands, 
Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom).5  I then compare public sentiment towards 
military intervention in Libya to the decision made by each country on whether to contribute 
to OUP.  
In each country facing immediate electoral pressures, the decision about military 
intervention in Libya correlated with the preferences of the public.  Denmark and France 
faced publics that favored military action and both countries contributed to NATO’s 
intervention.  Germany and Poland faced publics that opposed military intervention and both 
countries refused to contribute to OUP.  This evidence supports my hypothesis (H1a), 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!Spain is designated as having no immediate election, despite holding elections in November 2011.  
These elections were called early due to domestic political issues unrelated to the decision to 
intervene in Libya.  Since the decision to call for early elections was made in July 2011 (after the 
March 2011 decision on Libya), I contend that Spain was absent immediate electoral pressure during 
decision-making over military intervention in Libya. 
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suggesting that immediate electoral pressure motivates governments to make decisions about 
military intervention that are consistent with public opinion. 
The absence of near term elections proves to be a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for governments to disregard public opinion in foreign policy making, supporting 
hypothesis H1b.  The Netherlands, Spain, and the UK faced public sentiment that favored 
military intervention and each country decided to contribute to NATO’s mission.  Hence, 
despite being free from electoral pressures, these governments remained true to public 
opinion in their foreign policies.  On the other hand, both the Czech Republic and Romania 
pursued foreign policies that disregarded public sentiment.  The Czech government faced a 
public that favored intervention, yet the government chose not to contribute to OUP. 
Romania faced a public opposed to intervention, yet the government decided to contribute to 
NATO’s mission.  Overall, these results suggest that the electoral cycle moderates whether 
foreign policy is constrained by public opinion (see Table 3).  When a government faces 
immediate electoral pressures, public opinion will be reflected in foreign policy decisions.  It 
is only absent these electoral pressures that governments may ignore public opinion.   
I follow a similar approach to test my legislative constraint hypothesis that countries 
with stronger legislative checks on foreign policy are more likely constrained to public 
opinion.  I first determine whether my case countries have strong or weak legislative checks  
on foreign policy.  I draw from the democratic subtype, nature of governing coalition, and 
presence of an ex ante veto data presented in Table 2, and code weak checks as 0 and code 
strong checks as 1.  For democratic subtype, less majoritarian systems (coalition 
parliamentary and presidential systems) are coded 1 and more majoritarian systems 
(Westminster parliamentary and semi-presidential systems) are coded 0.  Second, countries 
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with coalition governments are coded 1 and countries with a single-party majority are coded 
0.  Finally, countries where parliament has an ex ante veto over deployments are coded 1 and 
  
countries without an ex ante veto are coded 0.  The sum of these legislative constraints 
represents the overall legislative constraint on foreign policy making, placing my case 
countries on a scale from 0 to 3.  I condense this scale into a dichotomous category, where 
countries with overall scores of 0 or 1 have weak legislative checks and countries with 
overall scores of 2 or 3 have strong legislative checks (see Table 4).  I determine that six 
countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain) face 
strong legislative checks on foreign policy making, while three countries (France, Romania, 
and the UK) face weaker legislative constraints.  
 
 
Public 
opinion 
Timing of elections Contribution to 
OUP 
Policy correlates 
opinion? 
Czech Republic For No immediate election No intervention No 
Denmark For Immediate election Intervention Yes 
France For Immediate election Intervention Yes 
Germany Against Immediate election No intervention Yes 
Netherlands For No immediate election Intervention Yes 
Poland Against Immediate election No intervention Yes 
Romania Against No immediate election Intervention No 
Spain For No immediate election Intervention Yes 
United Kingdom For No immediate election Intervention Yes 
Table 3. Empirical Test: Electoral Constraint Hypothesis  !
Public opinion refers to overall public sentiment towards international military intervention in Libya and 
is drawn from the public opinion data presented in Table 2. Timing of elections is similarly determined by 
simplifying the upcoming election dates presented in Table 2 into the presence or absence of an election 
within a year of the decision to intervene in Libya.  !
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My analysis of these legislative constraints and whether foreign policy decisions 
correlate with public opinion delivers mixed results.  These results do not support the 
hypothesis (H2a) that a strong legislative check on foreign policy is sufficient to motivate 
governments to make decisions about military intervention that are consistent with public 
opinion.  While Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain are constrained by 
strong legislative checks on foreign policy and their decisions towards Libya reflected public 
opinion, this does not hold true for the Czech Republic.  The Czech government faced 
favorable public opinion and strong legislative checks, yet abstained from intervening in 
Libya.  Given the small size of my set of cases, this divergence casts doubt that strong 
legislative checks are sufficient to constrain foreign policy to opinion (see Table 5).  The 
 Democratic 
subtype 
Nature of 
governing coalition 
Presence of ex 
ante veto 
Total Legislative 
constraint 
Czech Rep 1     1 0 2 
Denmark 1 1 1 3 
France 0 0 0 0 
Germany 1 1 1 3 
Netherlands 1 1 0 2 
Poland 1 1 0 2 
Romania 0 1 0 1 
Spain 1 1 1 3 
UK 0 1 0 1 
Table 4. Legislative Constraints of Case Countries  !
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hypothesis (H2b) that weak legislative checks on foreign policy are necessary for 
governments to ignore public sentiment is similarly unsupported by my evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These initial results suggest that in the case of immediate elections, electoral 
pressures are sufficient to constrain policy to opinion.  This accounts for the decision of four 
out of nine case countries (France, Denmark, Poland, and Germany).  Since my legislative 
constraint hypothesis fails to independently account for the decisions of the five remaining 
countries, I now test whether the combination of facing no upcoming elections but having 
strong or weak legislative constraints is sufficient to account for government decisions 
towards OUP.   
Figure 1 presents this combined analysis of public sentiment, electoral horizons, and 
the strength of legislative checks. This analysis reveals six paths that lead to the foreign 
 Public 
opinion 
Legislative Constraint Contribution to 
OUP 
Policy correlates 
opinion? 
Czech Rep For Strong legislative constraint No intervention No 
Denmark For Strong legislative constraint Intervention Yes 
France For Weak legislative constraint Intervention Yes 
Germany Against Strong legislative constraint No intervention Yes 
Netherlands For Strong legislative constraint Intervention Yes 
Poland Against Strong legislative constraint No intervention Yes 
Romania Against Weak legislative constraint Intervention No 
Spain For Strong legislative constraint Intervention Yes 
UK For Weak legislative constraint Intervention Yes 
Table 5. Empirical Test: Legislative Constraint Hypothesis  !
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policy decisions made by my case countries.  Path 1 and Path 5 were previously identified 
and suggest that, regardless of the strength of legislative checks on foreign policy making, an 
immediate election is sufficient to constrain governments to public opinion in their foreign 
policy making.  A lack of immediate electoral pressure in combination with strong legislative 
constraints is indeterminate.  These conditions are not sufficient to constrain foreign policy to 
public opinion or consistently predict that governments will ignore public opinion. This is 
demonstrated in the divergence between the Netherlands and Spain (Path 3) and the Czech 
Republic (Path 4).  Conversely, my evidence suggests that a lack of immediate electoral 
pressure in combination with weak legislative checks on foreign policy is sufficient for 
governments to intervene regardless of public opinion.  Path 2 and Path 6 show that all case 
countries without immediate elections and with weak legislative constraints chose to 
intervene militarily in Libya.  This raises the possibility of an interventionist bias in these 
strong states.  Such bias is beyond the scope of this analysis, but presents an avenue for 
further research.  
 
a. Key Case Studies  
 
Since my initial analysis suggests that immediate elections are singularly sufficient to 
constrain policy to opinion, I now present two key case studies –Denmark and Poland – to 
strengthen casual inferences from these findings.  Denmark and Poland are both cases where 
an upcoming election was identified as singularly sufficient to constrain policy towards 
Libya to the dictates of public opinion.  In Denmark, the public approved of military 
intervention, the government faced upcoming elections, and Denmark intervened as part of 
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OUP.  The Polish government faced upcoming elections but the public was opposed military 
intervention and Poland abstained from NATO’s mission. By focusing on the details of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Danish and Polish decision-making about Libya, these case studies provide further evidence 
of the role of elections in constraining governments to public opinion in their decisions about 
military intervention.   
In a 2011 speech, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2011) commended Norway 
and Denmark for striking one third of the targets in Libya despite having provided only 
twelve percent of allied strike aircraft.  Secretary Gates also pleaded publically for Germany 
Sufficient condition 
NOT sufficient condition!
Figure 1. Paths to Observed Outcomes  !
Public 
approval 
Immediate 
election 
Path 1: Intervene 
France, Denmark 
No Immediate 
election 
Weak Leg. 
Constraints 
Strong Leg. 
Constraints 
Path 2: Intervene 
United Kingdom 
Path 3: Intervene 
Netherlands, Spain 
Path 4:  
NO Intervention 
Czech Republic 
Public 
disapproval 
Immediate 
election 
No Immediate 
election 
Weak Leg. 
Constraints 
Strong Leg. 
Constraints 
Path 5: 
NO Intervention 
Poland, Germany 
Path 6: Intervene 
Romania 
No Case Evidence 
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and Poland to contribute to the campaign but both countries steadfastly refused to become 
involved (Cloud 2011).6 With the exception of Secretary Gates singling out Denmark and 
Poland for their contrasting positions towards OUP, these two countries have otherwise been 
characterized by a marked degree of similarity. Denmark and Poland are Atlanticist countries 
and are amongst those NATO members who were small but militarily capable of contributing 
to OUP (Bell & Hendrickson 2012; Wivel 2013).  Denmark and Poland both contributed in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, gaining reputations as active supporters of NATO (Bell & 
Hendrickson 2012: 154; Jakobsen 2012: 106-107).  As of 2010, Denmark’s military 
expenditures amounted to $4,504 million, accounting for 1.5 percent of Danish gross 
domestic product (GDP).  Poland out spent Denmark, with military expenditures hitting 
$8,781 million, accounting for 1.9 percent of GDP (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute 2012).   
Further, Denmark and Poland had comparable national interests in Libya.  While 71 
of Libya’s crude exports go to Europe, 58 percent of these exports end up in Italy, Germany, 
France, Spain, or the UK.  The remaining 13 percent is dispersed the rest of Europe (Energy 
Information Agency 2013).  In the case of Denmark and Poland, only PGNiG, a state-
controlled Polish oil and natural gas giant, was operating in Libya as of 2011 (Nolan 2011).  
Danish oil interests in Libya were limited to general, global oil and shipping interests (James 
2011).  Additionally, Denmark and Poland had only marginal migration concerns emanating 
from Libya (Spiegel 2011).  Finally, center-right coalition governments governed both 
Denmark and Poland, with the Liberal, Conservative, and Danish People’s parties governing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!Gates also appealed to the Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey to contribute to air strikes, as these 
countries had limited their contributions to non-offensive support.!!!
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Denmark and Civic Platform (PO) and Polish People’s party (PSL) forming Poland’s 
conservative government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013; Pidd 2011).   
Denmark and Poland both face strong legislative constraints on foreign policy, though 
there is still variation between the two.  The Danish parliament possesses an ex ante veto 
over military deployments while the Polish parliament does not (Wagner et al. 2010: 47-48, 
80-81).  Additionally, a tradition of minority governments pushes Danish politics towards 
consensus.  Together, this makes Denmark one of the most legislatively constrained countries 
in Europe.  Poland is comparatively less constrained, yet despite differences in legislative 
constraints, the Polish government was motivated to mirror public opinion in its policy 
towards Libya.  Turning individually to each country, an examination of the discourse of 
Danish and Polish leaders reveals the attempts each government made to assuage voters with 
their decision towards Libya in the run up to their 2011 parliamentary elections.  
 
i. Denmark  
 
With minority governments and a parliamentary ex ante veto over military 
deployments, any decision for military intervention faces high institutional hurdles in 
Denmark.  With numerous legislative veto points over foreign policy, a first look suggests 
that it is very difficult for Denmark to pursue any military intervention or similarly activist 
foreign policy.  Yet, as humanitarian crisis loomed in early 2011, a domestic consensus arose 
in support of intervening in Libya.  A March 2011 Gallup Poll revealed that 78% of Danish 
voters supported military involvement in enforcing the UN mandated no-fly zone over Libya 
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(Buley 2011).  With Denmark facing parliamentary elections upcoming in September 2011, 
this support for intervention was not ignored in Danish foreign policy circles.   
With the support of a significant majority of the Danish electorate, the Danish 
government and a wide spectrum of Danish parliamentarians began to perceive OUP as good 
domestic politics, as well as an opportunity for Denmark to pursue its wider foreign policy 
interests. Danish foreign policy elites and parliamentarians began publically to characterize 
intervention in Libya as an ideal opportunity for Danish foreign policy.  The Danish Foreign 
Policy Yearbook 2012 characterizes the intervention in Libya as a perfect war from a Danish 
perspective:  Libya’s humanitarian rationale tapped into the Danish commitment to promote 
UN norms, stability in North Africa was perceived to be a Danish national security interest, 
and the Danish air force, unengaged elsewhere, was available so Denmark could ‘do its part’ 
as a member of NATO (Jakobsen & Moller 2012: 108-109, 111).7     
With eyes on the upcoming September 2011 elections, Danish elites seized OUP as a 
good foreign and domestic political move.  Danish participation in OUP was approved 
unanimously by parliament.  Such political consensus was critical, mitigating the political 
risk associated with military deployment in the face of upcoming parliamentary elections.  
Danish Prime Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen announced Denmark’s support for OUP and 
explained that while Denmark is a small country, they recognize and uphold their 
international responsibilities (Ahram Online 2011).  Rasmussen made Danish F-16s available 
to NATO without caveats and dropped 11% of the total bombs dropped during OUP 
(Jakobsen & Moller 2012: 114, 119).     
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!For more on post-Cold War Danish foreign policy, see Wivel 2013.!!
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ii. Poland 
 
In contrast with Denmark, the Polish parliament does not have an ex ante veto over 
military deployments, though the nature of the Polish parliamentary system still erects some 
legislative checks over foreign policy.  Looking at legislative constraints alone suggests that 
Poland could more easily engage in military intervention than Denmark, but public opinion 
on the eve of elections complicates this assumption.  Polish parliamentary elections 
immediately followed the decision about Libya.  Yet, unlike in Denmark, no opposition 
parties were calling for action in Libya.  In light of split Polish public opinion that was 
generally unfavorable towards military intervention in Libya, Poland’s conservative coalition 
government was ill advised to intervene in Libya if they wished to maintain office beyond 
2011.   
Lacking public and parliamentary consensus in support of intervening in Libya, the 
Polish government was unable to disperse the political risk of a military intervention in the 
face of upcoming elections.  Therefore, citing public opinion as a key reason, Polish Foreign 
Minister Radoslaw Sikorski announced Poland’s refusal to contribute to OUP (Bell & 
Hendrickson 2012: 155-156).  Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk assured his public that 
Poland would only take part in military action in Libya if there were ‘immediate dangers’ to 
Polish and NATO security (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011).  Lacking public support and 
wishing to avoid suffering the domestic political costs attached to the decision about Libya, 
Tusk presented the military intervention in Libya as ‘European hypocrisy.’ In these 
accusations, Tusk pointed to Europe’s inconsistency over human rights, namely cozy 
relations with Arab Spring dictators (Reuters 2011).  With Poland scheduled to take over the 
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EU presidency in July 2011, Tusk also suggested that a neutral Poland might serve as a more 
credible mediator for the EU in post-intervention Libya (Dylla 2011).    
Polish foreign policy elites characterized the intervention in Libya very differently 
than their Danish counterparts.  Foreign policymakers from the two countries perceived 
different political incentives or disincentives for contributing to OUP and responded to public 
sentiment with different portrayals of the Libya mission.  Denmark, empowered by 
supportive public opinion, embraced the narrative of humanitarian and alliance responsibility 
in the name of Danish national interest, and intervened in Libya.  Conversely, Poland faced 
more mixed public opinion and the conservative government risked blowback at the ballot 
box if they took initiative in Libya.  Therefore, Poland rejected the narrative of humanitarian 
and alliance responsibility, suggesting an alternative role for Poland as a neutral EU 
negotiator and refused to intervene in Libya.  Overall, the interaction of different public 
opinions with electoral pressures constrained Danish and Polish decisionmakers to different 
policies towards OUP.  Danish and Polish leaders presented voters very different 
interpretations of the choice for military intervention in Libya.  These differences were not so 
much the result of holding deep and differentiated views of humanitarian intervention, but 
rather, Danish and Polish leaders faced different political incentives in light of public 
sentiment and pressing parliamentary elections.   
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The!scope!and!character!of!NATO’s!intervention!in!Libya!can!help!us!understand!what!to!expect!next!time!a!humanitarian!crisis!compels!the!allies!to!act.!!This thesis 
investigates the conditions under which governments mirror public opinion in their foreign 
policies and asked whether public opinion helps explains why some European countries 
intervened in Libya, while others sat on the sidelines.  My findings suggest that governments 
are constrained to public opinion in their decisions about military intervention when they 
face upcoming elections.  If there are no elections in the near future, governments have the 
flexibility to either mirror or disregard public opinion.  My findings also suggest that when 
governments do not face an immediate election and have only weak legislative checks on 
foreign policy, governments pursue military intervention regardless of public opinion.  This 
finding presents the possibility of an interventionist bias, but this bias is outside the scope of 
this analysis, presenting an avenue for further research.     
This thesis adds to the existing literature on the role of public opinion in foreign 
policy by explicitly focusing on the interaction between public opinion, the electoral cycle, 
and legislative constraints on foreign policy.  My findings support Gaubatz’s (1991) 
argument that the electoral cycle moderates government choices for military action, but 
suggest that the effect of the electoral cycle on this choice depends on the direction and 
strength of public opinion.  Gaubatz (1991) assumes that a war-averse public prevents the 
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initiation of military conflict in the face of an upcoming election, yet my analysis of Libya 
showed instances where the public favored military intervention and leaders decided to 
intervene despite upcoming elections.  My findings also cast doubt on the role of parliaments 
as a ‘transmission belts’ for public opinion, especially when there are no pressing elections.  
Further research is required to better determine the role of parliaments in constraining foreign 
policy to public opinion.   
Overall, my results indicate that considering public opinion is critical for 
understanding government decisions about military action, but also that public opinion 
cannot be considered in a vacuum.  Other domestic political arrangements, chiefly the 
electoral cycle, must be considered.  Additionally, when utilizing public opinion in foreign 
policy analysis, scholars must set aside assumptions of a war-averse public and recognize 
that public sentiment can either dissuade or encourage governments to take military action.  
This thesis also contributes to policy discussions about the future of NATO and 
European willingness to contribute to the alliance.  In the wake of OUP, commentators 
compiled lists of good, contributing NATO members, and bad, free-riding NATO members.  
My findings suggest that such commentaries should be tempered.  European contributions to 
OUP do not necessarily represent a lasting delineation of willing and unwilling member 
states.  Rather, the actions taken by European governments towards Libya reflect national 
public sentiments within varied electoral time horizons.  The enthusiastic contributors of 
OUP may abstain from coming missions, while countries on the sidelines of the Libyan 
intervention may step up to lead NATO’s next mission. My findings suggest that future 
European contributions will depend on the tides of public opinion and the timing of NATO’s 
next mission relative to national elections.   
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Finally, while I argue that the implications of which countries were willing or 
unwilling to contribute to OUP are limited, the results of this thesis are still important for 
NATO.  Because electoral horizons and public sentiment vary across so many allies, it may 
be difficult for NATO to move beyond continually shifting coalitions of those willing to 
contribute to missions.  With NATO contributions held hostage by electoral time horizons 
and public sentiment, my findings only add to the ongoing uncertainty as to whether NATO 
can consistently and continually fulfill its raison d’etre.           !
 
  
! 37 
REFERENCES 
Ahram Online (19 March 2011). Denmark, Norway prepare contribution to Libya action.  
Ahram Online, Retrieved from http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/8050.aspx 
 
Alvarenga, D. and A. Bugge (23 March 2011). Portugal PM resigns as parliament rejects  
austerity. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/23/us-
portugal-crisis-idUSTRE72M2CK20110323  
 
Auerswald, D. (1999). Inward bound: Domestic institutions and military conflicts.  
International Organization, 53(3), 469-504. 
 
------. (2000). Disarmed democracies: Domestic institutions and the use of force. Ann Arbor:  
The University of Michigan Press. 
 
Bell, J.P. and R.C. Hendrickson (2012). NATO’s Visegrad allies and the bombing of  
Qaddafi: The consequences of alliance free-riders. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 
25, 149-161.  
 
Buley, J. (25 March 2011). Danish six-pack attacks Gaddafi. The Copenhagen Post:  
International Edition. Retrieved from http://cphpost.dk/news/danish-six-pack-attacks-
gaddafi.410.html  
 
Central Intelligence Agency (2013). The world factbook: Field listing: Government type.  
Central Intelligence Agency. Available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html   
 
Chan, S. and W. Safran (2006). Public Opinion as a constraint against war: Democracies’  
responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Foreign Policy Analysis, 2, 137-156.  
 
Chapell, G. (2011). Operation Unified Protector: No “Swan Song” for NATO. The Polish  
Quarterly of International Affairs, 2, 63-78. 
 
Clark, D.H. and T. Nordstrom (2005). Democratic variants and democratic variance: How  
domestic constraints shape interstate conflict. The Journal of Politics, 67(1), 250-270. 
 
Clark, M. (2011). Curious victory for NATO in Libya. London: Royal United Services  
Institute.  
 
Cloud, D.S. (09 June 2011). Gates calls for more NATO allies to join Libya air campaign.  
Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/09/world/la-
fg-libya-nato-20110609  
 
Davis, W. (2012a). The public opinion-foreign policy paradox in Germany: Integrating  
domestic and international levels of analysis conditionally. European Security, 21(3), 
347-369. 
! 38 
 
------. (2012b). Swords into ploughshares: The effect of pacifist public opinion on foreign  
policy in western democracies. Cooperation and Conflict, 47(3), 309-330. 
 
Dieterich, S., H. Hummel, and S. Marschall (2008). Parliamentary war powers and European  
participation in the Iraq War 2003: Bridging the divide between parliamentary studies 
and international relations. Published by Parliamentary Control of Security Policy 
(PAKS) at the University of Dusseldorf, 1-32. 
 
------. (2010). Parliamentary war powers: a survey of 25 European parliaments. Occasional  
Paper 21, published by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF), 1-94.  
 
Dylla, D. (03 June 2011). Poland, Libya, and NATO. New Atlanticist: The Atlantic Council  
Policy Blog, Retrieved from http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-
atlanticist/poland-libya-and-nato   
 
Economist Intelligence Unit (19 April 2011). Poland politics: Divisions over foreign policy.  
Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Views Wire. Retrieved from 
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA254342714&v=2.1&u=unc_main&it
=r&p=AONE&sw=w&asid=00378aad156338922d1e022c6ac1cedb . 
 
Energy Information Administration (2013). Country analysis: Libya. U.S. Energy  
Information Administration. Retrieved from 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=LY.  
 
Gates, R. (2011). The Security and defense agenda (Future of NATO), speech by Secretary of  
Defense Robert M. Gates, US Department of Defense, Brussels, 10 June 2011.   
 
Gaubatz, K.T. (1991). Election cycles and war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(2), 212- 
244. 
 
The Guardian (02 March 2011). EU arms exports to Libya: who armed Gaddafi?. The  
Guardian: Data Blog. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/eu-arms-exports-libya#data 
 
Gertis, F. (2011). Understanding Belgium’s engagement in Libya. The Holland Bureau.  
Retrieved from http://www.thehollandbureau.com/2011/03/28/understanding-
belgium’s-engagement-in-libya/  
 
Hallams, E. and B. Schreer (2012). Towards a ‘post-American’ alliance? NATO burden- 
sharing after Libya. International Affairs, 88(2), 313-327.  
 
Holsti, O.R. (1992). Public opinion and foreign policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann  
consensus, Mershon series: Research programs and debates. International Studies 
Quarterly, 36(4), 439-466.  
! 39 
 
Howorth, J. (2012). CSDP and NATO post-Libya: Towards the rubicon?. Security Policy  
Brief, EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, 1- 6. 
 
International Energy Agency (21 February 2011). Facts on Libya: oil and gas. International  
Energy Agency (IEA). Retrieved from http://www.iea.org/media/news/facts_libya.pdf  
 
Isernia, P., J. Juhasz, and H. Rattinger (2002). Foreign policy and the rational public in  
comparative perspective. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(2), 201-224.  
 
Jakobsen, P.V. and K.J. Moller (2012). Good news: Libya and the Danish way of war. Pp.  
106-103 in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2012, edited by N. Hvidt and H. 
Mouritzen. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). 
 
James, S. (17 April 2011). Scandinavian and other “neutral” states support assault on Libya.  
World Socialist Website. Retrieved from 
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/04/scan-a12.html 
 
Johnston, R. (30 March 2011). Poll: Stay out of Libya. Ceskapozice.cz. Retrieved from  
http://www.ceskapozice.cz/en/news/politics-policy/poll-stay-out-libya  
 
Kennedy, C., Z. Nyiri, P. Isernia, P. Everts, and R. Eichenberg (2011). Transatlantic trends  
survey, 2011 ICPSR34422-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [distributor], 2012-12-10. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34422.v1 
 
Lindstrom, M. and K. Zetterlund (2012). Setting the stage for the military intervention in  
Libya: Decisions made and their implications for the EU and NATO. Swedish 
Defense Research Agency (FOI), 1-94.  
 
Lombardi, B. (2012). The Berlusconi government and intervention in Libya. The  
International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46(4), 31-44. 
 
Mahoney, J. (2012). The logic of process tracing tests in the social sciences. Sociological  
Methods & Research, 41(4), 570-597. 
 
Marshall, M.G. and K. Jaggers (2010). Polity IV Country Reports 2010. Societal-Systems  
Research and Center for Systemic Peace [distributor], 2010. Available at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm 
 
Mello, P.A. (2012). Parliamentary peace or partisan politics? Democracies’ participation in  
the Iraq War. Journal of International Relations and Development, 15, 420-453.  
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013). Government and Politics, Retrieved from  
http://denmark.dk/en/society/government-and-politics/?sc_lang=en  
 
! 40 
NATO (2011a). Military Spending of the NATO countries from 1990 to 2011* (in million  
U.S. dollars). Statistica [distributor]. Available at: 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/263127/military-spending-of-the-nato-countries-
1990-2011/   
 
------. (2011b). Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats. Public Diplomacy  
Division- Press & Media Section Media Operations Centre, 02 November 2011.  
 
Nolan, L. (5 December 2011). Libya’s riches. Warsaw Buisness Journal. Retrieved from  
http://www.wbj.pl/article-57173-libyas-riches.html 
 
Nordsieck, W. (2013). ‘Parties and elections in Europe.’ Available at: http://www.parties- 
and-elections.eu/index.html  
 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services (2013). European election database. Norwegian  
Social Science Data Services (NSD) [distributor]. Available at: 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/index.html  
 
Oppermann, K. and H. Viehrig (2009). The public salience of foreign and security policy in  
Britain, Germany and France. West European Politics, 32(5): 925-942.  
 
Panetta, L. (2011). Carnegie Europe (NATO), speech by Secretary of Defense Leon E.  
Panetta, US Department of Defense, Brussels, 5 October 2011.   
 
Peters, D. and W. Wagner (2011). Between military efficiency and democratic legitimacy:  
Mapping parliamentary war powers in contemporary democracies, 1989-2004. 
Parliamentary Affairs, 64(1), 175-192. 
 
Pidd, H. (10 October 2011). Poland re-elects PM Donald Tusk. The Guardian, Retrieved  
from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/10/poland-re-elects-donald-tusk 
 
Presseurop (22 March 2011). War in Libya makes kingdom work. Presseurop, Retrieved  
from http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/564041-war-libya-makes-
kingdom-work 
 
Ragin, C.C. (1987). The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative  
strategies, Berkeley, California: University of California Press.  
 
------. (2000). Fuzzy-set social science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Reiter, D. and E.R. Tillman (2002). Public, legislative, and executive constraints on the  
democratic initiation of conflict. The Journal of Politics, 64(3), 810-826. 
 
Risse-Kappen, T. (1991). Public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in liberal  
democracies. World Politics, 43(4), 479-512. 
 
! 41 
Reuters (09 April 2011). Polish PM chides Europe over Libya “hypocrisy”. Reuters,  
Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/09/us-poland-eu-
libyaidUSTRE7381G620110409 
 
Schuster, J. and H. Maier (2006). The rift: explaining Europe’s divergent Iraq policies in the  
run-up of the American-led war on Iraq. Foreign Policy Analysis, 2, 223-244.  
 
Spiegel (28 February 2011). Europe’s favorite dictators: The EU has failed the Arab world.  
Spiegel Online International. Retrieved from 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/europe-s-favorite-dictators-the-eu-has-
failed-the-arab-world-a-748074.html 
 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2012). SIPRI Military Expenditure  
Database. Retrieved from 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database   
 
STRATFOR Global Intelligence (2011). Special series: Europe’s Libya Intervention. Austin,  
Texas: STRATFOR.  
 
Tago, A. (2009). When are democratic friends unreliable? The unilateral withdrawal of  
troops from the ‘coalition of the willing’. Journal of Peace Research, 46(2), 219-234.   
 
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), adopted by the Security Council  
at its 6498th meeting, 17 March 2011.  
 
Valasek, T. (2011). What Libya says about the future of the transatlantic alliance. London:  
Centre for European Reform.  
 
Wagner, W., D. Peters, and C. Glahn (2010). Parliamentary war powers around the world,  
1989-2004: A new dataset. Occasional Paper 22, published by the Geneva Centre for 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 1-126.  
 
Wivel, A. (2013). From peacemaker to warmonger? Explaining Denmark’s great power  
politics. Swiss Political Science Review, 19(3), 298-321. 
 
 
  
